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Contemporary legal thinking is in the thrall of a cult of flexibility. We obsess
about avoiding decisions without all possible relevant information while ignoring
the costs of postponing decisions until that information becomes available. We
valorize procrastination and condemn investments of decisional resources in
early decisions.
Both public and private law should be understood as a productive activity
converting information, norms, and decisional and enforcement capacity into
outputs of social value. Optimal timing depends on changes in these inputs’
scarcity and in the value of the decision they produce. Our legal culture tends to
overestimate the value of information that may become available in the future
while discounting declines over time in decisional resources and the utility of
decisions. Even where postponing some decisions is necessary, a sophisticated
appreciation of discretion’s components often exposes aspects of decisions that
can and should be made earlier.
Disaster response illustrates the folly of legal procrastination as it shrinks
the supply of decisional resources while increasing the demand for them. After
Hurricane Katrina, programs built around flexibility failed badly through a
combination of late and defective decisions. By contrast, those that appreciated
the scarcity of decisional resources and had developed detailed regulatory
templates in advance provided quick and effective relief.
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INTRODUCTION
One of law’s most basic functions is to displace decisions across time. A system without temporal displacement is one of will, not of law. Even when the law makes decisions of immediate, or retroactive, effect, it is relying on rules of recognition established at some point in the past. Invocations of “the rule of
law” may be demands for consistent treatment, but they are just as likely to be pleas to resolve issues
under rules specified in advance. Locking in our own past decisions allows us to override our own fleeting impulses without submitting to the rule of others.
Legal discourse is deeply ambivalent about the proper timing of decisions. It declares that a condition
on the ownership of land that could take effect more than twenty-one years after the end of all relevant
lives in being is an invalid attempt by the “dead hand of the past” to control the future. Yet the country
eagerly defers to a Constitution written over two centuries ago by barely a quarter of the states now in the
Union at a time when politics, commerce, and society were fundamentally different – and when a substantial majority of the people was denied any voice whatsoever. Commentators attribute much of this
country’s fabulous wealth to the law’s having encouraged people make contracts committing themselves
in advance to courses of action they may later regret. Yet much of the current economic crisis results
from individuals’ and businesses’ overcommitting themselves in a future they too-dimly understood –
some of which commitments the law is setting aside through bankruptcy and bail-outs.
Debates about when decisions should be rendered or reserved are both ancient and ubiquitous. They
underlie familiar jurisprudential debates about the relative merits of rules and standards and, to an extent,
debates on the importance of generality in law.1 The early Federalists believed that deciding important
questions in elections was improper; those matters should await the convening of the legislature.2 On the
other hand, modern constitutional law cautions (albeit rather unpersuasively) that the legislature’s failure
to exercise sufficient discretion itself may render unconstitutional its delegations of discretion to the
executive; 3 more meaningfully, it warns against the vagueness resulting from insufficient exercises of
discretion. 4 Administrative law sees this question as the trade-off between rule-making and adjudication,
leaving the choice largely to the executive but prescribing a different course of procedural remedies
depending on the path selected.
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Compare, e.g., FRANZ NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN MODERN SOCIETY (1986)
(arguing that exercising discretion across a broad range of subjects, rather than with particular events in mind, is essential for
maintaining personal freedom); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975)(finding the
rule of law an unqualified good), with JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979) (rejecting
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Thus, for example, Roger Sherman condemned specific instructions for interfering with the “duty of a good representative to
inquire what measures are most likely to promote the general welfare.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 764 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). See
generally Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights: The View from 1787/1791, 9
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357 (2007).
3
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
4
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939).

Pre-commitment in policy-making is appealing in large part because it is not well-informed, serving as
a sort of veil of ignorance 5 to filter out some self-serving biases. Expanded executive powers are available to Presidents Bush and Obama alike. Courts will enforce our contracts no matter which of us turns
out to have made the better deal. Yet this preference for decisions that are in significant respects uninformed flies in the face of the modern administrative state’s strong drive toward ever-more informed decisions. More broadly, it conflicts with the fundamental precept of the Information Age. And with technological and cultural change proceeding at a feverish pace, decisions made in the past, even the recent past,
increasingly seem intolerable obstacles to progress.
Courts and scholars have considered at great length the proper timing of particular kinds of decisions.
They have done relatively little work, however, on a theory of the most desirable timing for legal choices
generally. Moreover, what scholarship has moved in this direction has tended to confound the questions
of when a decision should be made and who should make it. 6 Although one choice occasionally dictates
the other, far more often law can delegate or withhold authority independently of any stipulations about
when that authority is exercised. Thus, preferring that trusted actors – the police, prosecutors, administrative agencies, judges, or the private sector – make a decision does not require that they dither upon receiving that delegation. Analyses of the timing of legal decisions also typically focus on public officials
substantively regulating the private sector. 7 This article addresses a considerably wider array of legal
decisions, including fiscal and managerial decisions within public law as well as those in procedural law
and decisions of legal significance made by private parties. Its draws its in-depth illustrations from public
law, but includes fiscal as much as regulatory law.
This article seeks to develop a theory of the best timing of legal decisions that is shorn of institutional
associations. In doing so, it analyzes law as a productive enterprise. Like any productive enterprise, law
seeks to obtain necessary inputs at the lowest costs while producing output of the greatest feasible value.
When conditions for production are suboptimal, the law can proceed despite the scarcity of important
inputs (either paying the required premium or producing a lower-quality decision with inferior inputs), it
can cancel production altogether, or it can postpone production until a scarce input becomes more
plentiful. If it puts off production, it risks having the availability of other inputs, or the value of its
potential output, decline in the interim. This article contends that, because of a variety of analytical errors
5

See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971)(seeking to “nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at
odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their advantage”).
6
Professor Kaplow asks many of the same questions this article does, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992), but he fails to differentiate between changes in the timing of decisions and their delegation
from legislative to enforcement authorities. Id. at 561-62. As a result, he provides little guidance on the purely temporal aspects
of decision-making, such as whether to postpone the exercise of retained authority and whether to require prompt action when
delegating power.
7
Id. at 561-64; HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 145-58 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, eds. 1994); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125-29
(2d ed. 1994).
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and psychological predispositions, law often postpones decision-making counter-productively.

In

particular, while information typically becomes more plentiful over time, other inputs to legal decisions,
particularly decisional resources, often become scarcer over time and postponed legal decisions often
have considerably less value.
This article recognizes that different actors may have different interests about when particular decisions ought to be made and implemented – those that oppose any action at all may first try to stall, those
that see the political winds turning against them may try to hurry – and sometimes these timing preferences are strong enough to affect bargaining on the substance of policies. 8 This article, however, focuses
primarily on which timing arrangements would best serve social needs across the range of policy areas.
Accordingly, this article does not address the political legitimacy of decision-making as such. To be sure,
however, making more valuable and clearer decisions can play an indirect role in winning acceptance for
the decision-maker. And precommitment often will immunize decisions from accusations of bias.
Part I seeks to concretize the gauzy concept of flexibility. It suggests that both the creation and the abrogation of regulatory, budgetary, and adjudicatory policy typically occurs in four stages. Characteristic
patterns of legal conflict occur at the transitions from one to another of these stages. Flexibility, then, is
postponing movement to the next stages in the formulation of a decision or retaining the authority to
retreat to one of the earlier stages. This typology provides the means of separating decisions that can and
should be made in advance from those for which flexibility truly is needed.
Part II lays out an economic theory of the optimal timing of legal decisions.
Part III seeks to understand the current affinity for sweeping flexibility. It identifies logical errors, the
conflation of procedural, institutional, and temporal concerns, and a psychological tendency to focus on
one kind of flawed decision to the exclusion of others.
Part IV then illustrates these points with examples from disaster preparedness, mitigation, and relief.
It chooses Hurricane Katrina as an example in part because it represented one of the most egregious
failures of government in recent times and in part because disasters would seem to offer an environment
well-suited to showcase flexibility’s strengths. Among other things, the substance of optimal policy decisions generally is uncontroversial and disasters’ episodic nature lowers the stakes on both institutional
and procedural questions. In addition, arguments for making early decisions seem weak: vital information – the time, place, and severity of the disaster – is unavailable much in advance, and the rapid, welltargeted response that flexibility supposedly promises is especially important in an emergency. Yet the
ironic result in a crisis is that too much flexibility leads to a paralysis of options. Federal, state, and local
planning processes so valorized discretion that they made many too few useful investments of decisional
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resources. When the hurricane approached, the demand for decisions far outstripped the supply of decisional resources.
This same imbalance continued in the hurricane’s aftermath. This is evident in a comparison of three
agencies’ disaster relief efforts. It finds that the rule-bound agency acted much more quickly and effectively than the two with far greater flexibility. With a detailed set of policies already well-known to staff
in the field, the rule-bound agency needed only to abrogate a handful of policies that did not make sense
in the post-disaster environment. The surfeit of flexibility the other two agencies had preserved for
themselves required decisional resources far beyond their capacity in the post-disaster environment. Even
when they eventually did act, their hurried exercises of discretion proved substantively defective.
This follows a broader pattern. On the one hand, the policy-making community undervalues the utility
of information available in advance of a crisis, such as that concerning the general vulnerability of people
with very low incomes. On the other, it overvalues information that arises in a crisis, such as that about
the particular track a storm may be projected to take. It also underestimates the cost of government
officials’ producing timely decisions once they finally receive the late-breaking information.
I. THE DYNAMICS OF LEGAL PROCRASTINATION
Decisions that legal institutions must make typically involve several stages. Some stages may require
the various decisional inputs in quite different proportions than others. As a result, the optimal timing of
the different components of an aggregate decision may be quite different from one another. A component
that depends heavily on information might usefully be postponed until that information becomes more
available, while a component that depends far more on decisional resources or a clear set of norms may
best be made early, when those resources are more readily available. Unfortunately, contemporary proflexibility literature fails to disaggregate decisions in this manner. Instead, it seeks to postpone all of a
complex set of decisions by identifying a single component for which late-arriving information would be
helpful. Failure to disaggregate decisions has given a sense of fuzziness to the line between rules and
standards. 9 Many legal materials whose relative “rule-ness” scholars debate actually contain some
decisions made and others postponed. Systematically separating the one set from the other, rather than
treating them as gray continuum, is essential to evaluating each timing decision.
To that end, section A provides a typology of discretion intended to provide more texture than common references to “broad” or “narrow” discretion. This typology can support trans-substantive comparisons of the extent of flexibility retained (or delegated without an expectation of immediate action). It also
allows limiting flexibility to the aspects of a larger decision for which delay really is cost-effective. Section B then provides an abbreviated survey of the kinds of substantive and procedural debates that arise
9
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about exercises of discretion by different tiers of public authority. Much of this conflict comes at the
points where early decisions must be reconciled with those that were delayed in the name of greater
flexibility. Thus, a less dogmatic pursuit of flexibility could avoid many resource-consuming battles.
A. A Typology of Discretion
Although both the popular media and scholarly literature champion discretionary governance in general, they often are quite vague about just what kind of discretion they mean. Maurice Rosenberg distinguishes between “primary discretion,” the ultimate decision-maker’s ability to choose among a wide
range of options, and “secondary discretion,” the scope of a subordinate decision-maker’s immunity from
reversal. 10 Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between “strong” and “weak” forms of discretion in quite similar terms. 11 Yet on closer examination, these seeming dichotomies turn out to be more of a continuum:
as a subordinate entity enjoys increasing immunity from reversal even on decisions a higher body
dislikes, the initial decision-maker ceases to be subordinate in any meaningful sense. 12 These distinctions
have value in assessing transfers of power among institutions – which may or may not involve temporal
displacement of decision-making – but they have limited value in assessing directly our propensity to
postpone decisions. In particular, because they are only matters of degree, they offer little help in disaggregating decisions into discrete components whose assignment and delay can be debated.
Forms of reserved discretion may be distinguished along two important dimensions. First, a choice
can be categorized based on its stage in the decision-making process: whether it affects the initiation of
policymaking, the completion of a policy that is ready to implement, or some intermediate stage. Second,
a choice can be either affirmative or negative: it can either add to the formation of policy or can void and
reopen decisions already made. Each of these distinctions has practical consequences. The typology set
out below permits considerable specificity in arguments for reserving “more” or “less” discretion. To
date, arguments that are valid for postponing decisions at the final one or two stages in a process have
been invoked to postpone more formative decisions for which no compelling reason to delay exists. More
broadly, this typology also permits establishment of consistent trans-substantive policies on the timing of
decisions, thereby helping to expose covert efforts to manipulate timing to serve undisclosed institutional
or substantive ends.
1. Stages in Policymaking
Formulating legal directives typically involves several stages. An organ of the law may perform one
or several steps and then leave others for later consideration, by that organ or another. The implications
of interrupting the policy formation process to preserve discretion depend on the stage at which the process is interrupted.

Four decisional stages can be identified in the formulation of most policies.
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Notwithstanding the custom of distinguish exercises of legislative and administrative authority from the
courts’ decision of cases, these same patterns exist in legislation, in administrative law, and in judicial
decision-making. Indeed, although commitment and enforcement systems may look quite different, the
same general pattern exists in private law-making as well.
First, someone must exercise initiative discretion, to decide that action will be taken in a particular
area. Administratively, for example, OSHA must decide which of many workplace toxins it will regulate.
Legislatively, Congress must decide it wishes to subsidize the child care expenses of low-income
families. Judicially, a state legislature (or a common law court) must decide to act against public drunkenness or unconscionable contracts.
Second, someone must exercise normative discretion, deciding what values will be pursued through
that action. Thus, the Occupational Safety and Health Act declares that OSHA must pursue the complete
elimination of workplace hazards if feasible and, as interpreted by the Court, may not consider the costs
to industry unless the regulation would destroy its economic viability. Congress has vacillated about
whether child development or poverty amelioration are goals of its child care programs on a par with
workforce mobilization; it primarily has left those normative choices to the states. For the most part, this
country has attacked public drunkenness to prevent injuries to others’ persons or property rather than to
promote abstinence; it has attacked unconscionable contracts in pursuit of both distributive and
procedural justice. 13
Third, someone must exercise structural discretion, selecting a framework for the policy intervention.
Here, OSHA must decide whether to establish exposure limits for a toxin, to mandate particular protective
equipment, to require labeling, or to intervene in some other way. Congress has decided to reimburse
child care secured in the private market rather than to build a string of public child care centers. State and
local legislatures often have chosen to criminalize public drunkenness. Courts have determined that the
remedy for unconscionability shall be unenforceability; in some specific cases, Congress and state legislatures have established additional penalties.
Finally, someone must exercise quantitative discretion, supplying the particular, often arbitrary, quantitative elements that activate the structure chosen. This typically is the final exercise of discretion
needed to set a government activity in motion.14 OSHA selects a specific exposure limit for a particular
toxin or the minimum specifications for pieces of protective equipment – and determines how many
resources to devote to enforcing those rules. Appropriators determine how much money to spend on child
care subsidies in a given year while administrators decide the maximum amount they will pay per child
per month. State legislatures decide what blood alcohol content is required to be considered drunk and
13

Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
On occasion, quantitative discretion is essentially binary: some official or agency determines that a program should indeed
operate.
14

6

the amount of the fine or length of the sentence to be imposed on convicted drunkards. Courts evolve
doctrines of what degree of problems in the formation and terms of a contract suffice to support a finding
of unconscionability.
Quite different mixes of inputs are required to produce each type of decision. The law devotes its
costliest decisional resources to exercising initiative and normative discretion: its highest courts, high
officials elected by the voters or selected by those that were, and sometimes (in state and local systems)
the direct attention of the people themselves. These questions require high-level decisional resources because of a scarcity – and indeterminacy – of normative consensus, for which the heightened legitimacy of
top policy-makers is a substitute. Our commitment to limiting these matters to our highest-level decisionmakers, and the scarcity of decisional resources at that level, limits the number of legal initiatives that
may be started or redirected at any given time. 15 The amount of informational inputs required to exercise
initiative or normative discretion vary, but those inputs usually are “legislative facts”: 16 typically available widely and hence inexpensive.
Many exercises of structural and quantitative discretion are made in a similar manner. Contemporary
legal culture, however, does not insist that exercises of these forms of discretion consume the same
expensive type of decisional resources. The blossoming of the modern regulatory state, and the roughly
contemporaneous proliferation of balancing tests and similarly complex vehicles in caselaw, resulted
from our acceptance that bureaucrats and lower court judges could exercise quantitative discretion on important matters without direct oversight from senior officials. To be sure, some exercises of quantitative
discretion require large amounts of decisional resources even if those involved are relatively junior. On
the other hand, exercises of quantitative discretion more commonly require extensive informational resources, often including expensive expertise.
The sharp differences among these types of discretion have implications both for the advisability of
delegating them to subordinate authorities and for the optimal timing of those decisions. Answering those
two questions, however, requires quite different analyses.
2. Creative and Abrogational Discretion
The preceding subsection describes each stage of decision-making in affirmative terms, as way-stations toward the formulation of a policy. Not all discretion, however, operates as such creative discretion.
Some individuals or entities may be empowered to exercise abrogational discretion.
Abrogational discretion may operate globally, voiding all prior decisions. If the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) refuses to clear a proposed OSHA regulation, all of the agency’s work formulating its policy is for naught. A presidential veto of an appropriations bill may render irrelevant all prior
15
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decisions about how child care money in that bill should be spent. A court decision striking down a
statute criminalizing public drunkenness is likely to make the details of that statute irrelevant.
Abrogational discretion also, however, may operate more surgically. It may be camouflaged as creative discretion at a lower level. Thus, a nominal exercise of quantitative discretion in setting the blood
alcohol content may transform the regime’s norms from public safety to abstinence promotion if it
criminalizes any detectable degree of intoxication; the structural decision to assign responsibility for
OSHA enforcement to a hopelessly overburdened corps of inspectors may have the effect of reversing the
decision to initiate policymaking in that area.
Alternatively, abrogational discretion may involve deciding whether to make exceptions to any broad
policy decisions in a particular case. 17 This abrogation could take the form of a formal waiver or exception or merely an ad hoc failure to apply the policy according to its terms in a particular situation. OSHA
inspectors may elect not to take action against an employer releasing more of a toxin that the agency’s
rules allow if the employer is engaged in a vital activity or appears to be taking steps to resolve the
problem. States may transfer other funds to meet excess demand for child care subsidies or to pay above
their usual reimbursement rates for care provided at unusual hours. Judges and juries may either engage
in active nullification of criminal laws they dislike or temper their punishment of some drunkards. And
courts may enforce a contract that meets established criteria for unconscionability if it serves an important
economic purpose. 18
The exercise of abrogational discretion naturally leads to the question of what policies are substituted
for the ones rendered void. In some instances, the answer is obvious: the prior policy regime again
controls. Someone holding abrogational discretion under these circumstances may be reluctant to use it if
she or he likes the prior rule even less than the one subject to abrogation. Indeed, standing rules may
prevent parties from invoking the courts’ abrogational authority where the default rule would serve them
as badly or worse. 19
In other cases, however, abrogational authority carries with it the authority to re-make the decisions
voided. This implied creative discretion, rather than the dismantlement of a particular policy, often is the
primary source of disputes over the exercise of abrogational discretion. Letting a random employer exceed OSHA toxic emissions standards raises fewer concerns than having inspectors engage in a de facto
rebalancing of the factors the agency considered in promulgating the rule and creating an exception the
agency rejected. An administrator’s discretionary withholding of child care funds from states with
17

See generally Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (1991)(discussing the extent to which exceptions can
deprive rules of much of their value).
18
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997)(enforcing arbitration clause contained with product in sealed box).
19
See, e.g., Heimberger v. School District of City of Saginaw, 881 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1989)(finding plaintiff lacked standing to
challenge concededly unlawful policies because defendant had announced the intent to impose a harsher policy that was lawful
should plaintiff prevail).
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particular kinds of welfare policies sharply broadens the program’s effective normative scope. Immunizing white or middle-class drunkards from prosecution effectively adds a new, pernicious term to the
statute. Allowing favored companies or industries to enforce contracts meeting the usual standard for
unconscionability may provide a market-distorting subsidy.
Some of the key cases that narrowed judicial abrogational discretion under the fourteenth amendment
in the 1970s were indeed based on qualms about abrogation; 20 others, however, appear to reflect concern
about the courts’ competence and legitimacy exercising creative discretion to replace the policies they
might abrogate. 21 One key reason why many state courts undertake more aggressive judicial review on
both structural and substantive matters is their perceived greater legitimacy in exercising creative discretion to replace the policies they strike down. 22 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit’s increasing tendency to leave
in place agency actions it has found unlawful – to remand without vacating 23 – to avoid exercising the
creative discretion to decide which components of the prior regulatory regime to resuscitate.
In theory, an agency could redesign an entire regulatory regime through exercises of abrogational
discretion. Doing so would consume decisional resources most inefficiently. It also is likely to produce
inequitable inconsistencies. 24 On the other hand, reservations of abrogational discretion may prove quite
efficient if they encourage an agency to exercise more creative discretion in a timely fashion.25 The value
of abrogational discretion depends on the likelihood and importance of new information, or perhaps decisional norms, arising in the future. This naturally varies considerably from issue to issue: the steps required for safety on interstate highways change far less from year to year than those required for safety on
the information highway. The costs of abrogational discretion include transaction costs to process requests for its exercise and the costs of erroneous exercises of that discretion that are likely. Alas, choices

20
See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972)(finding several possible legitimate explanations for Texas’s payment of
higher benefits to predominately white categories of welfare recipeents than it did to the category that primarily served people of
color); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)(turning aside a muddled attack on state landlord-tenant law).
21
See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 379 U.S. 471 (1970)(refusing to strike down cap on the level of welfare benefits any family
could receive, noting the absence of a coherent, judicially administrable principle on which the increment for larger families
should be determined); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (noting the difficulty of determining the
degree to which each school district might be disadvantaged by disparate property tax bases).
22
See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1132, 1144-53, 1168-83 (1999)(discussing expanded state court enforcement of individual rights); In re Extension of Boundaries
of Hattiesburg, 840 So. 2d 69 (Miss. 2003)(upholding broad, subjective judicial role in setting municipal boundaries).
23
See Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1994)(documenting prevalence of practice); Kristina B. Daugirdas,
Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New Judicial Remedy for Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278
(2005)(criticizing the practice).
24
Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an
Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163; Alfred Aman, Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative
Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277.
25
This sequence is sometimes reversed in practice: having enacted a sweeping statute or regulation, Congress or an agency may
have second thoughts and establish an exceptions procedure. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2006)(providing for congressional
review of administrative actions). This reclamation of discretion dissipates to some extent the decisional resources that the
original statute saved but nonetheless is superior to abrogating the underlying rule completely.
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about how much abrogational discretion to reserve only intermittently reflect comparisons of these benefits and costs.
B. Patterns of Legal Conflict over Postponed Decisions
Most important policies in our system are the result of discretion exercised at different times and often
by different levels of government. Thus, resolution of legal disputes commonly requires reconciling separate exercises of discretion. To concretize the typology just presented in the context of substantive, institutional, procedural, and temporal struggles over flexibility, this section provides an overview of the ways
in which the different levels of discretion interrelate in common legal disputes. It should be noted that
reservations of flexibility tend to exacerbate these problems as they create uncertainty about the extent of
the discretion that has been exercised at each stage, allowing for overlaps of conflicting policies or
overlooked gaps in policy formulation. Subsection 1 considers challenges to the substance of decisions.
Subsection 2 turns to assertions that inappropriate procedures have infected decision-making. Subsection
3 then takes a closer look at abrogational discretion, a wild card that can upset the seemingly orderly
progression toward a decision that the other types of discretion chart.
1. Substantive Challenges to Exercises of Discretion
Battles over the role of the courts in reviewing the political branches’ substantive policy choices revolve around the proper assignment of actions within these categories. Challengers try to portray a
subordinate legal organ’s policy choices as involving exercises of types of discretion relatively high on
this scale. The challengers then assert that their opponent’s institutional superior – the Constitution, Congress, rule-makers, a higher court, or whoever – has exercised discretion at least that far down the scale,
thus creating a conflict; policies’ defenders do the opposite. Critics commonly see a betrayal of a higher
authority’s choices on initiative, norms, or structure in the challenged policy; defenders may assert that
the challenged action is the obedient calculation of a minor quantitative element that the pre-ordained
structure requires consistent with the pre-ordained scope of initiative and norms. Thus, for example, in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 26 plaintiffs asserted that Congress had exercised initiative,
normative, and structural discretion to protect parks and natural areas against encroaching highways; they
asserted that the Department of Transportation had contravened those choices, thus rejecting the congressional initiative, by substituting illicit economic norms, and by selecting a devolutionary structure. The
government, by contrast, asserted that Congress had only loosely invoked its initiative discretion, leaving
normative and structural questions to the agency; in the alternative, it asserted that it was merely exercising quantitative discretion in determining the ratio of environmental harms to construction costs that
requires rerouting a planned highway.
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401 U.S. 402 (1971).

10

The classic test of the validity of agencies’ interpretations of federal statutes under Chevron, USA v.
Natural Resources Defense Council 27 revolves around how much discretion has Congress already exercised: Step One – “whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue” 28 – addresses contentions that Congress’s decision-making reached farther down the hierarchy of specificity than the agency
claims. Step Two, in turn, considers arguments that the agency’s actions extend farther up that hierarchy
than it admits: that its actions do not “reasonabl[y]” fit with congressional choices.29 In other words, a
claim prevails at Step One if it can demonstrate that Congress has exercised discretion on the same level
as the agency but in an inconsistent manner; the agency defends such claims by asserting that Congress
left open the questions it resolved. To prevail at Step Two, a challenger concedes that congressional decision-making ceased at a higher level of generality than that at which the agency is ostensibly acting but
asserts that the latter has effectively nullified congressional decisions that a higher level, typically those to
initiate, or to determine the norms for, policymaking. When federal courts apply weaker Skidmore 30 deference, or state courts decline to follow the Chevron model, 31 they are empowering judges to interpret
more broadly the legislature’s actions to imply exercises of discretion at levels farther down the hierarchy
of decisions – and in so doing find conflicts with what the agency has done. The choice among degrees
of deference reflects a trade-off between the substantive priority of privileging the decisions of the
superior political body and the institutional priority of minimizing the abrogative discretion courts exercise. Where courts are seen as more legitimate (in state systems, particularly elected ones) or where administrative agencies fail to maximize their comparative legitimacy advantage over courts because they
fail to follow the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s) dictates for rulemaking or adjudication, 32
courts are prepared to intrude more in defense of legislative sovereignty.
Prior to Wickard v. Filburn, 33 many constitutional law cases turned on whether the Constitution had
limited Congress’s initiative discretion; similar arguments persist in local government law, under home
rule regimes 34 and particularly under Dillon’s Rule. 35 Where the principle of enumerated powers is inapplicable or has not plausibly been violated, constitutional disputes routinely involve dual contests: about
the extent to which the Constitution has prescribed or proscribed certain norms or structures, on the one
hand, and about the extent to which the challenged action implicates those norms or structures, on the
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other. Cases such as Dandridge v. Williams 36 (on finding constitutional norms) and U.S. v. Humphrey’s
Executor 37 (on finding constitutional structures) shape the former argument; those such as Washington v.
Davis 38 (on inferring the norms underlying challenged actions) and CFTC v. Schor 39 (on interpreting
structures) guide the second inquiry. Similar twin inquiries occur in testing lower courts’ adherence to
controlling precedent, Rosenberg’s “secondary discretion.” 40
Where the higher authority’s exercise of discretion clearly has left off before the point at which the
subordinate body began to exercise discretion, substantive review is rare. The Court has implied a background constitutional norm of rationality that is almost always available but almost never found to have
been violated; the arbitrary and capricious or abuse of discretion standard in administrative law41 and the
abuse of discretion standard in appellate review of trial courts play similar roles. In administrative law,
courts occasionally describe this lack of conflict as having no law to apply; 42 more commonly, they
simply find that the agency acted within its discretion. 43 Programs in which the underlying statute and
rules exercise relatively little discretion often are held not to generate individually-enforceable rights.44
The situation is slightly different within the judicial system. Often, little turns on the distinction between a subordinate authority usurping discretion already exercised by a higher authority, on the one
hand, and a subordinate entity exercising discretion on a matter truly open for decision, on the other,
because the result is the same in either case: the appellate court reverses the lower court and announces,
or reannounces, the rule it thinks best.45
2. Procedural Challenges
Procedural challenges to public actions also depend on this hierarchy. Some discretion simply cannot
be delegated. In criminal law, the initiative, norms, structure, and some quantitative decisions – at least
those necessary to allow an individual to determine the criminality of her or his planned actions – cannot
be delegated to the trial judge or jury. 46 In other areas of law, the government may reserve flexibility by
paying a specified procedural cost. If an administrative agency chooses to leave a point open in rulemaking, it must allow regulated individuals to argue that point in adjudicatory actions conforming to due
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426 U.S. 229 (1976).
39
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process; by deciding the point in advance, it can foreclose such arguments. 47 Here again, litigation may
revolve around determinations about how much discretion did the rule-writing authority actually exercise
in its rules. Here, however, challengers seeking broader hearing rights will wish to minimize the extent to
which the rules have resolved important questions.48
Over time, courts’ and commentators’ inclination to attribute exercises of discretion to norms – as opposed to expertise – has waxed and waned. If we believe that structural and quantitative discretion are
primarily the result of expertise, we may be inclined to give agencies particularly broad substantive and
procedural latitude. Treating those questions as more clearly dictated by prior exercises of normative
discretion anchors them in choices of politically accountable entities, either Congress or the President. In
rare cases, we may even question whether those higher entities have exercised sufficient normative
discretion to allow subordinate entities to act. 49
3. The Special Problem of Abrogational Discretion
Some of the most persistently difficult problems for our legal system have come from abrogational
discretion. In particular, once abrogational discretion is granted at all, it is difficult to restrain. We may
intend, for example, to allow abrogation only of our exercises of quantitative discretion, but we can do
little to prevent its exercise in a pattern determined by norms very different than those we intended our
system to embody. This is all the more true because our procedural rules typically disallow inquiries into
the decision-maker’s motives. 50 These problems are most obvious when such discretion is exercised
excessively but can also arise when it goes largely unused.
In extreme cases, abrogational discretion’s very existence can render all prior exercises of discretion
irrelevant. That apparently was the rationale of Clinton v. New York, 51 which denied the President the
power to render portions of legislation ineffective with a “line-item veto.” Critics of the residual exception to the hearsay prohibition make a similar same point, which has led to various (largely unsuccessful)
efforts to cabin it. 52 With the dissolution of prior decisions, reliance interests resting on those decisions
are undermined. We typically rely on norms of fidelity to the prior decisions to constrain the exercise of
abrogational discretion; when those norms break down, a seemingly insignificant grant of abrogational
authority can collapse an entire regulatory structure with waivers granted willy-nilly or a pervasive failure
of enforcement.

47
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On the other hand, policymaking can become confused by misplaced reliance on relatively dormant
abrogational discretion. We may excuse subordinate authorities’ exercises of discretion in contravention
of superior authorities’ decisions because we assume that available abrogational discretion can “clean up”
any resulting problems. For example, courts have relied on the availability of abrogational discretion to
uphold land use, immigration, and procedural rules that might otherwise be deemed exercises of normative, structural, or quantitative discretion inconsistent with higher law. Our political process similarly
relies on exceptions for hardship or fairness, 53 and places broad faith in mercy and discretion, to render
palatable decisions that otherwise might seem too harsh. Criticism of the highly discretionary style of
constitutional adjudication of some justices has focused on this flaw: that the vast majority of cases in
which an exception could plausibly be sought do not come before the Court and lower courts are unlikely
to grant relief without clear guidance.
Assumptions about the efficacy of abrogational discretion also can induce sloth in superior authorities’
exercise of discretion. We may rely on abrogational discretion to weaken rules we dislike but lack
consensus on how to replace. For example, in the years before a political consensus formed to repeal the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in 1996, the first Bush and Clinton
Administrations allowed states to waive AFDC’s major requirements.54
Abrogational discretion exercised too much, too little, or according to illicit criteria can raise serious
equity concerns. Within the criminal justice system, consistent police or prosecutorial practices not to enforce particular laws, or to decline enforcement in particular cases, can make an unexpected arrest or prosecution seem abusive. Conversely, many will suspect favoritism if someone is given a free ride for an
offense that typically yields severe punishment.55 Neither the human mind nor modern bureaucracy can
readily produce truly random decisions; those interested in a particular type of exercise of discretion are
likely to seek patterns in the exercise of that discretion. Thus, for example, juries’ waiver of the death
penalty in cases where the victim is African-American suggests usurpation: abrogational authority nominally limited to quantitative discretion – determining whether the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently
severe to warrant death – has been expanded to rewrite the system’s norms perniciously.
II. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCTION OF LEGAL DECISIONS
Contemporary legal theory rarely addresses the timing of legal decisions directly. Instead, it merges
those concerns with one of three other discussions. 56 First, it fuses temporal and institutional concerns. It
assumes senior officials – the legislature, senior executive officials, or high courts – will make early decisions and lower-level enforcement officials – front-line agency staff, police, and trial courts – will make
53
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postponed decisions. Although this is often true in practice, it need not be so. This conflation precludes
consideration of the merits of retaining authority but postponing its exercise or of delegating power with a
short deadline for decision.
Second, some discussions merge temporal concerns with procedural ones. This assumes that delay
will foster plenary procedures and that speed requires sacrificing some safeguards of fairness or accuracy.
Emblematic of this “ticking bomb” viewpoint are due process cases allowing 57 or rejecting 58 pre-hearing
seizures; similarly, most states regard the eviction of tenants to be sufficiently urgent to require “summary
proceedings” shorn of many of the familiar features of civil litigation.59 Yet time itself only occasionally
imposes an absolute barrier to more plenary procedures: more commonly, a greater commitment of decisional resources would allow equally expeditious action with more meticulous procedures. Conversely,
of course, delayed decisions can be terribly slipshod.
The most useful approximation of a direct discussion of the timing of legal decisions is the debate
between rules and standards. 60 At its best, this debate does indeed focus exclusively on the timing of
legal decisions. Unfortunately, these debates tend to frame a continuum of options artificially as a dichotomy, and an unrealistic one at that: every rule requires some interpretation, and every standard with
practical relevance forecloses some options. Moreover, discussions of rules and standards all too often
take primarily the perspective of the consumers of law – those subject to the law, and perhaps those
charged with enforcing it – to the exclusion of the problems attending law’s production.
When administrative law scholars address economics, they typically focus on outcomes: whether a
particular approach to regulation, or deregulation, will enhance or reduce the efficiency of a particular
industry, whether a particular public benefit rule will encourage or reduce particular kinds of behavior,
and so forth. When scholars turn to agencies’ decision-making processes, they tend to consider economic
factors only to the extent that the costs of adjudication serve as a drag on agencies’ ability to undertake as
fair or as accurate a process as might otherwise be desirable.
Administrative decision-making itself, however, is a form of economic activity. Legal institutions
convert information, a set of norms, decisional capacity and enforcement capacity into decisions that they
expect to have more value than that of the inputs required to produce those decisions. These inputs may
come from public or private sources, and the decisions that law produces include those of courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and private parties responding to legal rules. The agencies that produce
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administrative decisions must find ways of reconciling the demand (or need) for that service with the
available supply of it. Because we generally are unwilling to allow those with business before an agency
to bid for the privilege of having their matters decided, agencies do not reconcile supply and demand
through a market. Instead, the agency mediates both demand and supply by scheduling decisionmaking.
Nonetheless, imbalances between these forces can cause the same kinds of disruptions as a market that is
prevented from clearing. When the demand for administrative decisions increases, or when the resources
required to make those decisions become more expensive, the effective cost of decisions rises. Just as
inefficient queuing may be expected in a market that cannot produce sufficient supply to meet demand
due to price controls or limits on market entry, so too inefficient delays are likely when the government
cannot arrange for enough decisionmaking to meet demand. Similarly, just as the government may try to
relieve queuing in a constrained market with rationing or priority schemes, so too administrative agencies
may try to expedite some kinds of decisions at the cost of even more severe delays for others. In both
cases, the infrastructure required to gather the information needed to administer the priority system injects
its own additional inefficiencies, sometimes rivaling those of the queuing it seeks to avoid.
Developing a framework for analyzing when legal decisions ought to be made requires understanding
law as a productive activity. This Part analyzes the inputs and output of legal decision-making in
economic terms. Section A examines the ways in which these inputs may be scarce, noting that scarcity
often varies with time. Section B considers the social value of legal decisions, also in temporal terms.
Section C then explores the law’s options for addressing a perceived shortage of one or another input,
finding that delay is often counter-productive.
A. Scarcity of Inputs to Legal Decisions
Each of the inputs to a legal decision has a cost, with that cost typically rising with the amount of the
input consumed to produce the decision. In that sense, familiar to the economist, the inputs always are
scarce. Legal culture, however, tends to view scarcity in a different way. Where an input is unusually
rare or costly, or where a decision-maker can readily identify missing inputs that seem desirable, legal
culture see a problem to be solved. Commencing an inquiry on this rather impressionistic basis does little
harm, however, if the resulting choices about how to structure legal decision-making are sound. Because
these inputs’ scarcity often is at least partially a function of time, efforts to ameliorate scarcity often
involve changing the timing of legal decisions.
Of the four main inputs to legal decisions – information, applicable norms, decisional capacity, and
implementation capacity – the one whose scarcity legal culture most freely discusses as a problem is information. We avoid discussing deficiencies in decisional or enforcement capacity as they embarrass the
law, while lawyers often regard normative ambiguity as an intriguing challenge or an opportunity to
advance their clients’ cause. When commentators see a decision that, ex post, appears ill-informed, they
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tend to see that lack of information as an error that should be corrected in the future. Although the Due
Process Clause can criticize decisions made despite shortages of any of the four inputs, its basic requirement “to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections” 61 seeks to remedy informational deficits far more than decisional, normative, or
enforcement ones. 62
The law’s myopic focus on information costs parallels that in standard economic discourse. Economics long has recognized inadequate information as a form of market failure.63 Although Ronald
Coase and others long ago identified agency costs within firms as a particular type of shortage of
decisional resources, 64 only the relatively recent rise of behavioral economics has generalized concerns
about the sufficiency of market actors’ decisional resources – and the potential for those decisional resources to erode in inverse proportion to increases in information. 65 Classical economics still tends to
treat consumers’ preferences – in effect, their expressed norms – as exogenous and inviolable. 66 Most
economic discourse similarly tends to assume perfect enforcement of contracts, i.e., the infinite, costless
availability of enforcement resources.67 In the same way, the law’s focus on information costs, to the
exclusion of other inputs, distorts our judgment of the optimal timing of legal decisions because
information costs, alone among the four, commonly decline over time.
Scarcity of information can result from conditions in the world at large. At times, information may
simply be absent. Nobody knows which of the workers exposed to a toxin will become sick; nobody
knows what the decedent might have accomplished but for her untimely demise. In other situations, it
may be theoretically available but at an unrealistic, exorbitant price: no doubt modern forensics laboratories could work wonders resolving minor slip-and-falls or speeding infractions.
Scarcity of information also may result from the law’s own procedural rules. These rules can increase
the costs of obtaining and using some kinds information or bar access to some information altogether.
Delays can change those procedural rules, either as a direct result of the change in timing68 or because the
delay is incidental to a reassignment of decisional authority. For example, the desirability of administrative rulemaking, as opposed to developing policy through adjudication, is widely regarded as depending
in large part on whether broad public participation in a rule-making process will produce better policy
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than an adversarial or semi-adversarial adjudicative process and in part on whether the policy addresses
sufficiently recurrent issues that adjudications would be duplicative.69 Interested parties routinely seek to
arbitrage these procedural rules by seeking or opposing delay and, in so doing, may contribute to or
ameliorate information costs. Someone believing that the procedures likely to be employed in making a
decision at a later stage would be disadvantageous, 70 or expecting higher litigation costs, 71 might oppose
delay on that basis. Parties seeking the early resolution of a dispute may believe that the procedures that
would guide an immediate decision increase their chances for prevailing or may worry that the costs they
will incur waiting for a later decision will reduce its value to them. 72
Finally, information may be scarce because what we have is too chaotic to analyze efficiently.73 This
form of scarcity may abate over time not from the production of more information but because we invest
decisional resources in making sense out of it. Without that investment, the scarcity may remain or even
increase over time as the informational cacophony grows.
The unavailability of directly applicable norms prolong deliberations to allow a contest over establishing new norms, perhaps by adapting less pertinent ones. This, too, increases transaction costs, such as the
parties’ costs of becoming informed about the law,74 the costs parties and courts incur litigating the
applicable legal rule, 75 the costs risk-averse regulated expend ensuring compliance with the law, 76 entities
and the costs to the political system of having to negotiate a resolution or add the issue to the list of those
over which the next election is to be fought. Occasionally, delaying a decision can be expected to clarify
the applicable norms, as when a case on the same question is pending before a higher court. In other
cases, delay may either permit a consensus to develop or see views fragment further.
Shortages of decisional capacity, too, may a function of time. 77 Legislators, agency staff, judges, or
those in the private sector empowered to make legally significant decisions may be pre-occupied with
other matters. More subtly, they may lack the analytic capacity to appreciate fully the information and
normative commands pertinent to a problem. 78 They may be biased, 79 incompetent, 80 or overwhelmed. 81
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When facing a shortage of decisional resources, law can delegate the decision to others with more ample
decisional resources, ask the available decision-maker to “wing it” as best she or he can, or postpone the
decision until its own resources are less dear.
A shortage of enforcement capacity does not prevent decisions from being made. It can, however, eliminate most of any decision’s value. Law coerces compliance with its decisions and deters parties’ resort
to some extra-legal means in order to motivate parties to commit their resources to gathering the necessary information, clarifying the normative principles, and funding decisional capacity. 82 The ability to enforce a decision can fluctuate over time. A public official coming to the end of her or his term may need
to make decisions enough before leaving office to have time to enforce them; in a collapsing business or
legal system, speed of decision may be pivotal. Conversely, new leadership taking over a discredited
agency, legislature, court, or business may need to build goodwill before making controversial decisions.
B. The Changing Value of Legal Decisions
Legal decisions’ value also can change with time. Where a decision’s value would decline sharply
with time, the law may be willing to bear higher input costs just as a factory might pay above-market rates
for prompt delivery of a machine needed to meet a surge in demand. For example, when a plaintiff risks
suffering irreparable injury, the courts hold expedited preliminary injunction proceedings even though the
parties’ information production costs and the value of the court’s time may be higher than if the matter
came to trial in the usual course.83 More generally, earlier decisions reduce parties’ need to include
hedges against multiple contingencies in their plans. 84 They also may reduce the parties’ costs of learning
the law, 85 increasing compliance and the social benefits the law is designed to yield. Postponing the main
decision may require addressing subsidiary or interim matters first, duplicating transaction costs and
multiplying the costs of errors. For example, the longer a criminal trial is delayed, the greater the
importance of the decision on bail. 86 Postponing decisions also may force rushed decisions of secondary
matters that can only be addressed once the initial decision has been rendered.
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Decisions rarely become more valuable to society as a whole when rendered later, although particular
parties may benefit substantially from delay. The few situations in which a later decision may have
greater social benefit than an earlier one often involve processes of producing the decision with positive
side-effects that cease once the decision has been made.87 The very act of participating in democratic
decision-making 88 or participatory adjudication89 may foster civic virtues. Thus, even when the outcome
is clear, wise committee chairs and hearing officers postpone calling votes or rendering decisions until the
prospective losers have had the opportunity to speak their minds.90 Postponing a decision also may be
beneficial if no decision may ultimately be needed. 91
For the most part, however, maximizing the value of law’s output will be a factor counseling the early
production of a decision. This is particularly likely where the later decision reverses an earlier one: not
only does the late decision allow the public less opportunity to adapt to its own terms but it wastes the
adaptations made in response to the now-voided judgment. 92 Delayed or reversed decisions will rarely be
preferable unless the increased availability of inputs will improve the decisions’ quality significantly. 93
C. Responding to Input Scarcity
When the inputs of a decision appear unusually costly, law has four basic responses available. At one
extreme, it can simply devote the additional resources necessary to bear those costs, perhaps leaving it
unable to decide other matters or perhaps commandeering resources from other public or private pursuits.
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The legal system’s general willingness to allow litigation costs to exceed the amount at stake in many
civil cases is an example of this.94 At the other extreme, it can refuse to render a decision at all. To this
end, the law maintains an elaborate set of rules designed to husband public resources for cases in which
their investment is likely to produce a decision of greater value. Thus, for example, courts will not hear
disputes in which the plaintiff lacks a sufficient interest. 95 They will revisit decisions already made only
in narrow circumstances under which the new decision is likely to be particularly valuable. And the law
abstains altogether from intervening in wide areas of human affairs.96 For the most part, however, the law
chooses between two intermediate options: rendering a lower-quality decision based on what inputs it
can secure or shifting the decision to a time when inputs may be more plentiful.
The law often relies on default rules to respond to shortages of information, 97 normative guidance,98 or
decisional capacity. 99 These and other decisional work-arounds 100 effectively serve as lower-quality substitutes for the desired inputs. 101 As such, they presumably produce a lower-quality product: a decision
more likely to be “wrong” when compared with the result more copious inputs would have yielded. 102
Like a business, the law must be cautious of the effect on its reputation of issuing an inferior product.
Utilitarian mass consumers of law, such as banks and large retailers, may be satisfied with the results of
fairly crude default rules, just as lower-quality fruit suffices to make juice. On the other hand, the law’s
one-time individual users – tort plaintiffs, criminal defendants, and the like – are more likely to judge the
law’s legitimacy by whether it considered all relevant circumstances;103 they may respond to decisions
based on sub-par inputs the way supermarket shoppers do to aesthetically marred fruit. Because decisions
are law’s most visible and best-recorded result, its human agents tend to recoil from conspicuous
downgrades of the legal product.
Law’s other major response to shortages of inputs is to change its timing. Again like a profit-making
business, law seeks to optimize its social returns by conducting its productive efforts at the time when its
inputs are least costly and its decision will be most valuable. When useful information is missing, the
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applicable norms are murky, decisional resources scarce, or enforcement of any decision is uncertain, it
may postpone producing a decision until the input in question becomes more affordable.
Conversely, sometimes law must move expeditiously because delaying would increase the cost of one
or another vital input. Statutes of limitations recognize that information degrades over time. Constitutions lock in decisions based on norms that their framers fear might not endure. 104 Wills allow testators to
determine how to dispose of their property after they have lost the capacity to decide.
III. THE SOURCE OF ENTHUSIASM FOR FLEXIBILITY
The foregoing discussion suggests that the desirability of postponing decisions depends on the cumulative effect of changes in inputs’ costs, which can be positive or negative, and changes in the value of the
decision, which are likely to be negative. That is not, however, the way our legal culture usually approaches these problems. Instead, it leans toward legal procrastination, under the lofty moniker of “flexibility.” Popular opinion venerates private business in part because it regards business as more flexible
than government. 105 Administrative law allows sweeping, largely standardless delegations of law-making
authority to agencies because of their superior flexibility. 106 Politicians across the ideological spectrum
pay homage to state and local government for their presumed greater flexibility. 107 Popular history long
has blamed inflexible strategic planning – the Schlieffen Plan and its Russian counterpart – for catapulting Europe into the First World War. 108 Similarly, schoolchildren are taught to admire Robert E. Lee for
his flexibility and scorn George McClellan for his lack of it. 109 In social life, calling someone “flexible”
is generally a compliment; inflexibility is characteristic of bullies, dinosaurs, and control freaks. Some
imbibe this lesson with particular zeal: we are told that men seek flexibility in relationships “to wriggle
out of commitment, maturity, honor” 110 and all manner of uncomfortable decisions.
Enthusiasm for reserved flexibility also pervades legal scholarship. 111 The typical justification for reserving discretion is a critique of rule-making. It sets up a trade-off between the clarity and simplicity of
104
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a regulation, on the one hand, and its accuracy in achieving its substantive policy goals. 112 A bright-line
rule is easy to understand and inexpensive to apply, yet it almost inevitably proves both over- and underinclusive. The antidote, we are told, is the additional information that will become available if we reserve
discretion until the policy needs to be applied to particular cases. Although this may mean individual
adjudications in some cases, it also may mean acting legislatively on a class of cases only when a decision
becomes necessary, e.g., determining spending on a particular activity through annual appropriations
rather than multi-year legislation.
One might expect that substantively flawed decisions made with reserved discretion might trigger a
movement to rein in flexibility. 113 Although that is one possible response, critics are just as likely to
argue that the problem can be corrected by changing the procedure or institutional assignment for rendering the decision. Indeed, they may claim that the decision-maker put too low a value on information.
Demanding still more information prior to decision 114 could lead to even more delay.
This Part seeks to explain the heedless obsession with maximizing flexibility. Section A identifies
logical errors underlying many arguments for flexibility. Section B shows that much of the enthusiasm
for flexibility results from merging either procedural or institutional considerations with temporal ones.
Finally, section C explores psychological factors that cause us to fear erroneous precommitment far more
than other kinds of defective decisions.
A. Logical Errors Causing Flexibility to be Overvalued
Four common analytical errors that tend to cause underestimates of the costs of delay. First, commentators assume that more information is an unalloyed good. Therefore, because a later decision-maker will
have more information, they regard delay as desirable. In fact, information has value, but acquiring it has
cost. Decision-makers recognize this when not contemplating delay: they do not indiscriminately maximize the informational inputs but rather weigh the likely value of the data against the cost of hiring investigators, holding hearings, or whatever else is required to get it. 115 The same should be true of information expected to become available in the future: it presumably has value, but to obtain it we must bear
costs, including those of having one or another decision-maker refamiliarize itself with the problem,
regulated entities’ uncertainty while the decision is held open, and the possibility that decisional resources
– another key factor of producing a decision – will have become substantially more costly. Manufacturers may idle their production lines because they expect a sizeable drop in the cost of one factor of
production, but they presumably do so only after considering the costs of shutting down and reopening
their factories and the risk that another key input’s price may have risen in the interim.
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Second, and related, commentators sometimes focus myopically on one of the factors without appreciating the import of others. Most commonly, they overestimate the role of information in producing a
legal decision. They exaggerate the value of information they hope to receive if they wait (or overstate
the deficiencies in their present store). For example, Professor Kaplow implies that decisions at the
enforcement stage are cheaper than ex ante rule-making. 116 For this to be true, the cumulative cost of the
required inputs for several ex post decisions must be less than that of the inputs needed for a single ex
ante decision. This, in turn, requires that either information or decisional resources must be radically
cheaper at the enforcement stage. This seems unlikely. And if adjudicatory decisions are cheaper, that
does not necessarily mean that declining information costs are the reason: the legal system may simply
have selected costlier procedures for rule-making than for applying standards. If the difference in
procedures is unjustified, it hardly belongs in a comparison of the relative benefits of early and late
decisions. And if the difference does make sense, it likely is as a reflection of the less-valuable delayed
decision not warranting as extensive an investment as more useful ex ante rules. Law’s fatalistic
acceptance that much of the potential benefit of a decision has been lost in delay is no good reason to
suffer that loss deliberately by postponing the decision.
While the decision-maker awaits more plentiful information, decisional capacity may become increasingly scarce. The longer a testator waits, the more she or he is likely to know about prospective heirs. If
she or he waits too long, however, her or his decisional capacity will disappear. Similarly, “[m]otions in
limine are designed to avoid the delay and occasional prejudice caused by objections and offers of proof
at trial.”117 A hurried judge in the midst of a trial has less capacity to resolve complex evidentiary matters
– and postponing decisions sometimes allows improper evidence to degrade the trial’s decisional resources by contaminating the jury. 118 (Decisions in limine also are more valuable to parties seeking to
plan their strategies than rulings made at trial.119) And decisions that an actor may make honestly in
advance may engender corruption, favoritism or bigotry if postponed until officials know the particulars
of those affected. 120 Courts may deem an agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious due to insufficient
information, but they also may do so due to deficient applications of decisional resources. Professor
Schauer warns that the costs of insufficient decisional resources must be balanced against those resulting
from information shortages when decisions are made in advance.121
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Awaiting more plentiful information also can result in disappearance of the normative consensus that
would have guided a prompt decision. For example, giving convicts sentences whose lengths vary due to
prison officials’ decisions whether to award “good time” credit brings information into the decision about
whether to release the offender – but it also brings different norms into the decision.122 More recently,
California and some other states have developed systems in which long sentences precede parole with
numerous conditions, strictly enforced. The result has been a high rate of reincarceration for acts that are
not crimes but that violate parole rules; thus, these delayed incarceration decisions depend on norms farremoved from the laws the individual originally violated.123 Some observers, of course, may prefer the
norms that guide later decisions to those that would have applied ex ante. The broader point remains,
however, that the delay brought changes not only in the informational input but also in the normative
input, and the ultimate efficiency of delayed decision-making depends on changes in the costs of all
decisional inputs, not just information.
A third common analytical error is failing to appreciate the declining value of decisions delayed too
long. Even if inputs’ cost comes down, legal decision-making may produce less net value if the decision
accomplishes less. The law favors early decisions on economic matters because much of decisions’ value
is accommodating private parties’ risk aversion.124
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prohibition on some kinds of retroactive legislation, although distinguishing between retroactive rules and
prospective ones that change the value of choices made under prior policy has proven problematic. 126
The Supreme Court has read the Contracts Clause broadly to preclude later legislation from abrogating
administrative officials’ promises on which private actors have relied.127 Although this is unlikely to
prevent Congress from changing tax rules in ways that effectively reduce reliance interests that prior law
had established,128 legislators tend to find the ability to rely on early decisions a crucial component of
those decisions’ value. 129 Initial debates about Social Security turned precisely on the question of
whether to pre-commit to levels of support for the aged and persons with disabilities or to allow to “each
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generation … the determination of what is just and adequate.”130 Not only did those proposals lose out in
the 1930s, but by the 1970s Social Security’s pre-commitment rationale had rendered it inviolable. 131
Without an early decision, payments might still be social, but they could provide little security.
Fourth, some postponements of decisions accompany delegations to different bodies, typically courts,
administrative agencies or lower tiers of government. The recipients of these delegations may have better
access to information, may have superior decisional resources, or may adhere to normative rules that
those promoting delegation prefer. An observer’s opinion of the relative competence and legitimacy of
the original and subsequent bodies likely will help determine her or his enthusiasm for reservations of
authority. Those who hold Congress and administrative rule-writers in bad odor, or celebrate the expertise of agencies’ adjudicators, the wisdom of the courts, or the sensitivity of state and local government
will probably seek to postpone decisions to compel a transfer of decisional authority. They justify this
position by decrying planning “expressed in the way that administrative competence at each lower level is
more strictly circumscribed than is good for its vital functioning.” 132 Criminal law long has depended on
delegating decisions to prosecutors to counter-balance the populist excesses of anti-crime legislation. 133
Yet the law can delegate vast authority to prosecutors without delaying decisions about charging and
sentencing. 134
Finally, distributional concerns may override the desire to achieve the most efficient timing where the
costs of delay are born unequally. Delay in resolving civil litigation ordinarily cause the ultimate decision’s value to decline more rapidly for plaintiffs than the delay produces value for defendants,135 making
it socially inefficient, but defendants may have sufficient political influence to prevent the legislature
from committing more resources to the courts. The right to a speedy trial decision in criminal cases136
and to timely decisions in public benefits administrative hearings 137 depend less on calculations about
efficient timing than about distributional concerns. Despite the general timing advantages of motions in
limine, some courts limit or reject them from prosecutors out of concern that ruling out defenses
improperly shifts leverage away from defendants.138 Here again, however, as valid as the concerns may
be, they can be accommodated without dictating the timing of legal decisions. Even if policy-makers
130
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prefer meeting their distributional goals to efficiently timing legal decisions, they often can achieve both
by adjusting parties’ financial relationships to shift the incidence of the costs of postponed decisions.139
Sometimes these four fallacies compound one another. Postponing normative choices in the hope of
enlightenment from additional information can prove counter-productive when decisional resources
become scarcer. Several important evidentiary rules postpone complex normative decisions until trial.
For example, in most jurisdictions the list of exceptions to the prohibition on hearsay is not only
voluminous but non-exclusive. 140 This forces judges to make snap normative judgments about what are
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” and whether “the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence” as well
as the more information-dependent question of whether “statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts”. 141 Critics have questioned the desirability of rule-making authorities postponing these normative
decisions and delegating them to trial courts.142
New scientific and technological developments can complicate these calculations, changing the optimal timing of legal decisions in several ways. They can make information cheaper earlier. For example,
advances in genetics are allowing recognition of harm resulting from exposure to toxins long before
disease manifests itself. 143 Technology also may allow the identification of which persons suffered harm
from toxic exposure before a statute of limitations expires.144 On the other hand, technology may
facilitate destructive uses of information – such as employment discrimination, insurance underwriting, or
invasions of privacy based on genetic data – increasing the social cost of producing that information. 145
This can lead to policies prohibiting the assembly of particular kinds of information that might aid in a
decision. Technology may complicate the process of decision, requiring more costly decisional resources
such as longer trials or rule-making processes or more analytic capacity than most generalist judges,
juries, and lawmakers possess. 146 Science also can help refine default rules so that their invocation
degrades the value of a decision less.147
B. Conflating Procedural, Institutional and Temporal Concerns
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Under close examination, many arguments for flexibility reveal themselves as arguments for improved
decision-making procedures or for a different institutional decision-maker. Yet additional procedures and
delegations of responsibility usually can occur with or without significant postponement of the decision.
To the contrary, strong procedural and institutional concerns often argue against flexibility.
1. Procedural Arguments
Some commentators assume that delaying decision-making is necessary to allow procedures consistent
with careful deliberation or broad participation. For the most part, however, decisional resources rather
than time are the factor constraining choice of procedures. In fact, concerns about procedural justice
often militate against broad reservations of flexibility because of the ultimate decision’s reduced value.
Occasionally, the value decisions declines so rapidly over time that the law requires an authority to
exercise a certain amount of discretion before initiating a regulatory program. If a criminal statute,
particularly one limiting important rights, is too vague, enforcing authorities may not constitutionally
supply the missing details. An administrative agency in theory may not constitutionally regulate if Congress has not exercised enough discretion in the authorizing statute to supply an intelligible guiding principle, although such authorizing principles can nonetheless leave a great deal open. 148 Some statutes require administrative agencies to act through rules, 149 although the impossibility of anticipating every possible contingency in rules has left courts reluctant to enforce those requirements aggressively. 150 More
commonly, an agency’s failure to follow the designated procedures exercising discretion may disqualify
its decisions from having the force of rules. Preserving some abrogational discretion addresses any
claims for an opportunity to participate. 151
Even absent cognizable legal claims, concerns about fairness to regulated entities often deter legal
actors from retaining excessive flexibility. For the most part, ex ante exercises of discretion will allow
private actors to adapt to the regulatory regime and minimize the disruption of settled expectations. 152 On
the other hand, under some circumstances private actors may prefer to act first and have the opportunity
to justify their actions to regulators.
Preservation of large amounts of discretion does make policy formation more incrementalist. This appeals to several groups. Those preferring more participatory procedures for policymaking – either on
general principle or because they expect to be able to dominate the participation – may indeed find more
opportunities if large amounts of discretion are preserved. 153 In addition, those opposing the exercises of
148
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initiative or normative discretion in a given area will have greater opportunities to subvert those choices
later if flexibility is reserved. Those seeking sweeping policy change may prefer to roll out their initiatives a bit at a time rather than in one, highly recognizable thrust. 154 None of this, however, provides a
principled justification for flexibility.
2. Institutional Arguments
Institutional arguments are another mainstay of pro-flexibility discourse: comparing the legitimacy,
competence, and efficiency of the institutions that would decide if discretion is to be exercised ex ante to
that of the institutions that would inherit reserved discretion. Although this approach has obvious
practical appeal, it offers little guidance on when discretion should be exercised. For example, decentralizers commonly advocate relatively loose federal statutes to preserve as much discretion as possible
for states or localities; the preference to decentralize does not answer the question of when state or local
authorities should exercise their delegated discretion. Similarly, faith in the expertise of administrative
agencies may induce one to prefer minimalist authorizing statutes but does not determine whether the
agencies should act through rule-making or adjudication. And a general desire to minimize regulatory activity does not dictate when whatever authority that remains should be exercised. 155
The institutional counter-argument is equally unenlightening on the timing of legal decisions. A major
institutional critique of discretionary government has been that it tends to transfer power from an elected
Congress to less politically accountable bureaucrats. 156 Some also suggest that clear, bright-line rules are
essential to democratic legitimacy. 157 Lately, however, some scholars have argued that the involvement
of the President and close presidential advisors in regulatory policy-making is broader than had been understood, 158 at least moderating this concern. In addition, Professor Mashaw questions whether any
meaningful reduction in bureaucracies’ discretion is achievable. 159 His reference appears to be an institutional rather than a temporal one: he doubts senior decision-makers’ capacity to decide much more than
they now do. But knowing that decisions must be delegated does not mean that they must be delayed.
154

Peter Aranson, et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1983).
Some confusion can arise because the term “planning” can be juxtaposed either with leaving the free market undisturbed or
with having the government intervene but wait to do so. Most critics of government planning have the first meaning in mind, not
the second. See Lon Fuller, Freedom – A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1325 (1955)(declaring that planners lack
sufficient information); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 48-50 (1944)(arguing that complex activities need more
competition, not more planning).
156
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980)(Rehnquist, J., concurring); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 133-34 (1980); see Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1295-96
(1984).
157
THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92 (2d ed. 1969).
158
Nicholas Bagley & Richard Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006); Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
159
Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation, 1 J.L. & ECON. ORG. 81, 97 (1985). He posits a Law of Conservation of Administrative Discretion, which holds that attempting to confine discretion at one point in the process merely causes it to migrate to elsewhere in the
process. This fatalistic, hydraulic model may fit highly adversarial processes, such as campaign finance regulation or OSHA enforcement. It does not account for the great deal of administrative activity on which either a broad consensus exists or the agency
is not prepared to invest the political capital to make a fight.
155

29

The institutional checks and balances our system relies upon to reconcile these institutional concerns
also may be ineffective without more attention to temporal concerns than the current ill-structured, impressionistic approach to discretion permits. One major constitutional doctrine seeking to cabin subordinate actors’ exercise of discretion, the non-delegation doctrine,160 long has been dismissed as ineffectual, 161 at least at the federal level. 162 If the Court will find sufficient constraint on delegated discretion in
a statute requiring only that the executive act in a “generally fair and equitable” manner,163 delegations
have no meaningful limit.164 The Court essentially abandoned the task of specifying how much discretion
is too much. The typology set out in Part II, however, offers concrete options for the restructuring of such
a principle. Even current doctrine seems to require that the legislature exercise initiative discretion and
make some contribution to normative discretion, although federal cases allow that contribution to be quite
slight. Yet the rationale for many delegations – greater decisional capacity and cheaper access to information at the agency level – typically carries the greatest weight with regard to exercises of quantitative
discretion and, occasionally, structural discretion. Thus, a requirement that delegations of creative discretion be limited to the latter two forms, and one that legislatively specified norms constrain any abrogational discretion, would meet the needs of the administrative state while proving far easier for courts and
legislatures to apply. It would also compel the earlier rendering of decisions. If, on the other hand, we
decided that we no longer desire to restrain delegations of broad initiative and normative discretion to
administrative agencies, the Court could allow agencies to supply the constraining exercises of initiative,
normative, and structural discretion in advance where the legislature has failed to do so, 165 thus capturing
the benefits of agencies’ their expertise while minimizing the costs of politicized swings in policy. 166
The emblematic constraint on judicial discretion in the common law system – stare decisis and the
measured evolution of the law 167 – suffers from similar vagueness. Although we may have impressionistic senses of whether a new decision departs from prior law in large or small ways, the courts lack a
clear system for sorting departures from prior law. The typology set out above offers such a system.
Thus, a case exercising quantitative discretion about what level of contacts with a forum state justifies its
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant 168 is less significant than the initial one exercising nor160
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mative discretion to make “fair play and substantial justice” the object of jurisdiction inquiries and structural discretion to make “minimum contacts” with the forum state the nature of the inquiry169 – and less
significant than a subsequent decision adding “tradition” to the inquiry’s guiding norms. 170 Most of the
costs that stare decisis seeks to avoid – such as undermining reliance interests and willful or biased
judging – attach far more to reversals of exercises of initiative or normative discretion than to structural
discretion, and more to structural discretion than to quantitative discretion. This allows a high court to
delegate to trial courts, and to postpone exercise of, quantitative discretion while exercising higher-level
discretion itself. It also provides a means of reconciling the core values of stare decisis with the need for
the law to keep up with fast-changing social and economic changes 171 – which likely demand changes in
quantitative standards or perhaps the structure of legal analysis, but not the question of whether law
should intervene at all or the norms under which it should do so. To be sure, courts often achieve
something similar on an ad hoc basis today. Without qualitative means of describing discretion exercised
and that retained or delegated, however, courts and observers are left only with vague and contestable
notions of whether the discretion exercised is “a lot” or “a little” and judges desiring to delegate sufficient
authority for lower courts to meet unforeseen problems may inadvertently provide more power than those
courts require.
The potential for appellate review and legislative overrides of administrative and judicial actions also
provides a crucial part of the justification for delegations of discretion.172 If recipients of delegated power
reserve large amounts of discretion, higher bodies will have less time to assess and respond to those
decisions ultimately made. Acquiescence for lack of time for consideration, or because a reversal would
be too disruptive, replaces genuine accountability – and undermines legitimacy in the process.
Finally, we accept institutional arrangements under which unelected judges and bureaucrats exercise
vast authority in part on the basis that they must exercise that authority transparently, 173 making them
subject to political correction. Choices that judges might otherwise doubt are deemed ratified by the lack
of political resistance. 174 For extremely high-salience matters, this political oversight is inevitable, with
journalists and advocates sufficiently motivated to pierce any opacity. For more prosaic decisions, however, legitimating political accountability depends on transparency. Dividing authority between multiple
actors – appellate and trial courts, the legislature and an executive agency, senior agency policymakers
and line enforcement staff – already complicates the electorate’s task in determining whom to hold ac-
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countable and for what specific decision. To the extent those actors play their respective roles at widely
separated times because of a choice to reserve discretion, the electorate will be further confused.
C. Psychological Attachment to Discretionary Policymaking
Society’s willingness to invest decisional resources in rule-making fluctuates considerably over time.
At the moment, for a mixture of political, technological, and psychological reasons, the pendulum has
swung very far against policy-making through rules and in favor of broad reservations of discretion,
leaving many normative, structural, and quantitative issues open until closer to the time a policy needs to
be implemented in particular cases. As just noted, this sometimes results from a desire to avoid hard
political choices. It also results from the widespread ignorance of, and skepticism about, statistical and
other means of anticipating changes. More broadly, we focus on one particular form of decisional failure
– officials bound by policies that they know are mismatched to their situation – to the exclusion of several
other kinds. Professors Thibout and Walker offer empirical evidence that people expect judges to have
the flexibility to respond to their individual circumstances.175
This myopic attention to policy obsolescence results from our increasing tendency to treat a very
narrowly-defined conception of efficiency as the government’s primary goal. 176 This triumph of gesellschaft over gemeinschaft has driven both parties to recast their rhetoric in terms of economic efficiency
and to restructure public institutions with that goal. Federally, the economic view of government has produced the Government Performance and Results Act,177 President Clinton’s “reinventing government,”
and President Bush’s even more quantitative performance evaluation systems. 178 The efficiency-driven
economic model of state and local government manifests itself in increasing reliance on special districts,
public authorities, and other unelected special purpose governments. This economic orientation reflects
both academic arguments and a culture that demands immediate gratification. It prefers policies with
specific objectives, the executive’s forte, over the inchoate values of process, deliberation, and “civic
virtue” that relatively inefficient legislatures can offer.179
175
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This efficiency-oriented political discourse relies heavily on business metaphors. 180 The business
model of management features sweeping executive discretion, with few obvious analogues to administrative rules. Indeed, putting off decisions until they are required, rather than investing resources in a rulemaking process only to have the policies developed wait months or years to be needed, may seem
consistent with increasingly popular “just-in-time” inventory management strategies.
The presumption that the hierarchical executive is the most efficient branch of government 181 has,
along with the demise of the anti-delegation doctrine, 182 resulted in broader delegations through vague
legislation resolving fewer important issues. Although this could have meant that agencies’ rules replaced statutes, the result often has been a change in the nature, as well as the author, of governmental
action. The courts have been reluctant to require the executive to exercise its powers through rules 183 or
to attach negative consequences to the failure to do so. 184 Many agencies’ rule-making processes have
become so ossified that their requirements of time and resources exceed many policymakers’ tolerance.185
Difficulty in predicting changes in economic conditions and technology, and the sense that these
changes come faster than agencies can amend their rules, may someday lead to new ways of writing rules
to be more robust to such changes. It also may lead to changes the rule-making process, perhaps a reduction in the number of clearances an agency must obtain to publish proposed and final rules. 186 For now,
however, it has produced an impulse to leave important issues unresolved and in the hands of the fastermoving executive. 187 Some have argued that we are strongly predisposed to expect decisiveness, even
despotism, from our leaders. 188 We depend on leaders, and it is through their decisions that we are
empowered. 189

is seen in conservative law-and-economics scholarship that sees cost-benefit analysis as a tool for reducing the scope of government regulation. More recently, however, liberals too have begun singing the praises of governing methods whose chief virtue is
their efficiency.
180
Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1077 (2004).
181
Kagan, supra note 158, at 2339-46.
182
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
183
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
184
See, e.g., American Hospital Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to find the lack of formal rules
constrains agency’s exercise of discretion through informal policy guidance); but see U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)
(affording less deference to interpretations of statutes through such guidance). Indeed, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), gives the executive an incentive not to constrain its discretion: those constraints may create property rights enforceable
through the Due Process Clause.
185
David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare
Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1305-07 (2004).
186
Super, at 1306-07 n. 121 (giving examples of those clearances and why they tended to interact to clog the regulatory process);
Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 766-75
(1996) (identifying strong disincentives to rule-making that have evolved since presidential candidates began “running against
big government”).
187
This may be seen perhaps as a special case of skepticism that rules can ever be effectual in resolving important disputes. See
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1699-1701 (1976) (stating that
argument broadly).
188
George R. Goethals, Presidential Leadership, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 545, 548-49 (2005).
189
Ronit Kark, et al., The Two Faces of Transformational Leadership: Empowerment and Dependency, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 246,

33

In addition, the set of actors with whom one identifies often dictates one’s policy views. 190 The same
phenomenon that is “flexibility” from the perspective of decision-makers can be “instability” 191 or
“equivocation” 192 when seen through the eyes of those subject to those decisions, who may find planning
difficult or feel the need to curry favor with the decision-makers. 193 Recent experience with corruption
can build empathy with those being regulated and support rules seeking to cabin administrative
discretion. 194 Periodic corruption scandals apparently have failed to make enough of an impression to
temper the preference for discretionary administration. 195 And concerns that discretion may be exercised
in a discriminatory manner have made little headway against this country’s strong presumption that
racism is aberrational.196
Thus, most people tend to identify with the decision-maker. An individual gains leadership positions
in part by persuading voters that they have much in common with her or him. 197 Leaders are the prototypical member of the group that selects them; other members of the group naturally identify with the
leader. 198 Perhaps this also is the product of pluralistic democratic ideology, which encourages many
people, at least opinion leaders, to imagine themselves making crucial decisions. They attribute to the
leader their own qualities and values. 199 As a result, empathy with decision-makers dominates current
thinking. We imagine we would act virtuously in that position and we can imagine that person’s frustration at having her or his “hands tied” so that she or he is unable to pursue the evident wise course. 200
Unconstrained discretion also may appeal to policymakers, particularly those that previously held such
discretion in the business world. Ordinarily, one would expect regulated entities to champion rulemaking to give them definite rules against which to plan. At present, however, many business interests’
collective efforts are concentrating on reducing the substantive scope of regulatory authority. 201 This
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tion with policymakers also may distort our calculation of the economics of deferred decision-making.
All information processing activities have a cost to the government. The process of sorting among alternatives – the exercise of power – is a particularly pleasing form of work for policymakers, who may
discount its cost. 202
Alternatively, we may imagine ourselves as being able to persuade the decision-maker of the justice of
our own cause; our fear, then, is that the decision-maker will be persuaded but unable to act in our favor.
Perhaps this sense results from negative experiences with large public or private organizations in which
we were told – truthfully or otherwise – that the person on the phone or at the counter would like to help
us but lacks the discretion to do so. People with weak social identification prefer discretionary administration. 203
IV. DISCRETION AND DISASTER RESPONSE
Because of their high visibility and accelerated time-lines, disasters provide an excellent means of
examining otherwise obscure aspects of government behavior, such as the benefits and risks of reserved
discretion. On its face, disaster response would seem to present the perfect case for postponing decisions:
information about the time, location, and nature of the disaster are extremely valuable decisional inputs
and utterly unobtainable in advance. Evidence that maximizing reserved discretion is counter-productive
even in coping with disasters therefore would strongly undercut the case for legal procrastination
generally.
Disasters precipitate an acute imbalance between the demand and supply of administrative decisions.
The rapid increase in demand is apparent. Agencies must adjudicate of claims for relief benefits and
accusations that some people claimed benefits inappropriately. Another class of decisions is requests for
prospective guidance: what to do in an unfamiliar situation, which regulations may be disregarded, and
the like. People in the way of disasters tend to honor clear, directive statements from authorities. 204
Maintaining broad discretion on how to respond to a disaster commonly results in conflicting official
viewpoints. Although democratic societies value a diversity of opinion in normal times, during a disaster
it can cause costly indecision. 205 Finally, agencies face a host of intramural managerial decisions about
how to compensate for lost administrative infrastructure. More generally, disasters temporarily expand
the administrative state’s substantive agenda, incapacitating some institutions to which agencies commonly defer and suspending some of the rationales for limiting agencies’ interventions.
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At the same time, disasters sharply reduce agencies’ capacity to make and implement decisions. One
signal feature of a disaster is a sudden scarcity of resources. This scarcity commonly affects a wide range
of vital commodities: shelter, food, safe water, health care, transportation, communications, energy, and
sometimes even air. The suddenness of a disaster, and resulting shortages of information, 206 hamper efforts to prepare or tap reserves. These sudden shortages profoundly affect the administrative state. It
faces an acute deficit of decision-making resources. With the time and personnel scarce in the affected
area, it typically is ill-equipped to adjudicate. And with information, time, and communications short,
officials outside of the disaster area are ill-equipped to fill the gap.207
An organization anticipating sudden, severe imbalances between the demand for administrative decisions and the resources for supplying those decisions can prepare in several ways. Although efforts to
increase the supply of decisional resources draw the most attention, those efforts typically have limited
impact. The relative infrequency of disasters makes holding a large decisional capacity in ready reserve
infeasible. Even those decisional resources that can be marshaled may be difficult to transport into the
stricken areas and require time to orient to the situation.
Far more effective is to reduce demand for administrative judgments in times of crisis by deciding as
much as possible prior to the disaster. One obvious step is for an agency to ensure that it does not carry
backlogs of work from prior periods that would distract it when a crisis hits. 208 Because it cannot know
when a disaster will suddenly require their full attention, this entails keeping current on decision-making
at all times. More importantly, the agency can sacrifice flexibility to complete part of the decisionmaking process in advance. An agency cannot adjudicate an individual's case before that case arises. An
agency can, however, take action now that reduces its future adjudicatory burden. Setting clear policies
can prevent some disputes from ever arising. And for those determinations that cannot be avoided –
either because prospective measures failed to control behavior or because they do not involve behavioral
matters – an agency can simplify the issues by promulgating rules. Thus, rules can be seen as a form of
206
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decisional capital. Unfortunately, in the current climate, agencies show little interest in "saving" in this
manner. A key reason is the contemporary fascination with administrative discretion, leading to a preference for leaving decisions open as long as possible. This is yet another chronic structural flaw in the administrative state that Hurricane Katrina laid bare.
This Part shows how agencies following the standard prescription of retaining flexibility floundered
both before and after Hurricane Katrina while one often criticized as rule-bound and inflexible rose to the
occasion quickly and effectively. Subsection 1 shows that an unwillingness to invest decisional resources
proved just as ruinous as the lack of budgetary resources in federal, state, and local planning for the
disaster. Subsection 2 compares three agencies' responses to Hurricane Katrina to demonstrate the
dangers of relying on “just-in-time” policy-making.
A. Deferred Decision-making and Disaster Planning
The rapturous embrace of administrative discretion is dubious in theory; Hurricane Katrina proved it
calamitous in practice. Since the catastrophe, officials and their defenders routinely insist that they could
not possibly have anticipated of its scope and severity. In fact, thirteen months earlier over 300 people
from 13 parishes, 20 state agencies, and 15 federal agencies participated in a simulated response to a
hypothetical Hurricane Pam whose characteristics were eerily similar to Katrina’s. 209 A review of federal,
state and local planning efforts before Hurricane Katrina shows both a broad awareness of the specific
problems that would arise and a maddening refusal to invest decisional resources in pro-active planning.
The need to plan was widely accepted.210 Not accepted, however, was that meaningful planning required
the exercise, rather than the reservation, of discretion.
The National Response Plan (NRP) that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued in
January 2005 is more of an invitation to plan than a plan proper. “The Federal Government encourages
processes that support informed cooperative decisionmaking.” 211

“State and local governments are

encouraged to conduct collaborative planning with the Federal Government as part of a ‘steady-state’
preparedness for catastrophic incidents.”212 At times, it assigns tasks to particular officials in the case of a
disaster, but it largely fails to make specific provision for how readily anticipated needs, such as
transportation, emergency shelter, food, and medical aid, will be provided. It thus remains heavily
dependent on ad hoc information gathering and exercises of discretion at the time of a disaster. 213
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Had the NRP been intended as the beginning of a planning process, one might ask why it took so long,
but at least DHS could claim that Katrina’s timing was part of the problem. The NRP, however, was not
intended as such a beginning. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge declared that “America is better
prepared today, thanks to the National Response Plan.” He contrasted the NRP with other plans and
reports routinely issued in Washington: “Instead of promising results in the future, it is a deliverable that
we believe will bring definite results now.”214 The NRP abrogated and made sweeping changes to a prior,
Clinton-era plan, yet a Senate investigating committee declared that DHS’s implementation effort
“appears to have been entirely inadequate.” 215
New Orleans’s purported disaster plan was similar. 216 Throughout, its authors determinedly refused to
surrender meaningful discretion. The plan insists on the importance of “[p]roper and coordinated planning” 217 but fails to provide it. Instead, it repeatedly extols the virtues of training, enjoins all to work well
and harmoniously, and insists that it desires a positive outcome. "The Office of Emergency Preparedness
and the Office of Communications shall devise a mechanism whereby the largest possible segment of the
population can be sufficiently educated in disaster events to minimize panic and misunderstanding,
including elderly and special needs populations." 218 “Emergency management has to be prepared to
address the long-term operations needed to return the community to normalcy.” 219 Planners clearly
understood that their agencies might cease to function once a disaster hit,220 yet for the most part they
declined even to formulate default rules to govern important issues in that event.
Mayor Nagin recognized shortly after taking office that 100,000 people had no means of leaving the
city in a disaster, but his response was to try to leverage this fact to secure funding for a largely unrelated
light rail public transit system within the city. 221 Similarly, the City’s disaster plan acknowledged that
“[a]pproximately 100,000 Citizens of New Orleans do not have means of personal transportation” but
responded only with the vague assertion that “[s]helter assessment is an ongoing project.”222 Similarly, it
noted that “[t]hroughout the Parish persons with special needs, require special consideration regarding
notification, transportation, and sheltering.”223 It blandly promised that “[t]ransportation will be provided
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214
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to those persons requiring public transportation from the area” without another word of how that
transportation will be arranged. 224
At the Hurricane Pam simulation thirteen months earlier, New Orleans Emergency Preparedness Chief
Joseph Matthews reported that New Orleans could not execute a massive post-landfall evacuation because
it lacked sufficient qualified drivers and had not completed negotiations with transportation companies.225
Participants in the Hurricane Pam exercise responded by proposing that federal, state, and local governments pool their resources to provide some 600 buses and 1,200 drivers fifty hours before expected landfall. 226 Even this effort would only have accounted for about a quarter of the people in New Orleans
known to lack personal transportation, but officials again refrained from making the specific advance
decisions required to make this idea reality. The Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional
Plan (SLCHFP) that resulted from the Hurricane Pam exercise stated only that that “school and municipal
buses will be used to transport evacuees who do not have transportation.” 227 The regional plan was
similarly mum about how to move displaced persons from emergency shelters to temporary housing: it
leaves “tasks,” “coordinating instructions,” “personnel,” and “communications requirements” on that
issue “TBD.” 228 And it recognized, but had nothing substantive to offer, persons with special needs: The
SLCHFP says simply that “special needs evacuees will be directed to regional special needs shelters as
per the LA Shelter Plan.” 229 This failure to develop any sort of plan for sheltering individuals with
special needs outside the New Orleans area forced local officials to leave them in the Superdome, with
disastrous results. 230
Recognizing but then skirting another issue that would prove vital, the City’s plan blithely declares
that “[s]ecurity measures will be employed to protect the evacuated area(s) in accordance with established
procedures and situations,” saying nothing about what those “procedures and situations” are. 231
The plan does note that the public’s need to pack and prepare for an evacuation, and the limited
capacity of the roads leading out of town, require considerable advance notice. For a Category 3 hurricane – two levels less than what Hurricane Katrina was expected to be – the plan calls for a preliminary
evacuation notice 72 hours in advance, evacuation of special needs populations 60-64 hours in advance,
and a mandatory evacuation order for the general public 48 hours before expected landfall. 232 Anything
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less risked stranding residents as roadways became clogged with traffic and ultimately flooded.233 Yet
even here, the plan’s authors are so jealous of their discretion that they effectively instruct people not to
take it seriously: “In determining the proper time to issue evacuation orders, there is no substitute for
human judgment based upon all known circumstances surrounding local conditions and storm
characteristics.”234
This refusal to exercise discretion in advance – deciding which objective conditions would trigger an
evacuation order and agreeing on the terms of such an order – proved disastrous. New Orleans officials
began considering an evacuation order late, spent almost a day haggling over the details and logistics, and
ended up issuing it less than 24 hours before landfall.235 Although Amtrak and northern Louisiana public
transit systems were more than willing to help move people out of the city, New Orleans officials never
developed plans to address basic issues, such as where Amtrak should take people and how to move them
from train stations to state shelters. 236
Not only did this profligacy with decisional resources greatly increase the number of people stranded
in the City, but this faith in ad hockery prevented the state from responding timely to the consequences of
the predictably delayed evacuation order. With large thousands of people in the Superdome and Convention Center enduring increasingly desperate conditions, some officials were shooing away offers of buses
at the same time others were seeking to round them up. 237 FEMA officials, in turn, spent a day
squabbling with the National Guard over whether buses or helicopters were the best means of moving
people from the Superdome and Convention Center, further delaying post-disaster evacuations. 238
This tragic experience yields several general lessons. First, the assumption that the exercise of executive discretion is the most efficient decision-making method is a gross oversimplification. It considers the
(highly visible) costs of suboptimal result when a rule is applied to unanticipated circumstances but not to
the (far more obscure) costs of conducting de novo review of every problem presented. 239 Budgetary
processes offer few opportunities to compare costs of these two types. In ordinary times, suboptimal
decisions can stimulate adverse media coverage or political fights; demands for decisional resources
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exceeding supply will be addressed through one or another form of inefficient but largely invisible
rationing. 240
Second, even if one focuses single-mindedly on the risk of suboptimal decisions, those resulting from
overgeneralizations or lack of foresightedness in rules are only one kind. 241 The more questions left for
ad hoc decision-making, the greater the chances that the decision-maker will make an improvident
choice. 242 Our identification with decision-makers 243 causes us to assume that they all share the diligence
and good judgment we see in ourselves. Yet leaving many issues to be resolved only when a resolution
becomes necessary compels agencies to employ a large number of decision-makers, who inevitably have
divergent capabilities and personalities. 244 The Court has held that both transaction costs and the risk of
inconsistent results justify foreclosing issues that claimants might otherwise raise in hearings. 245
Third, quite ironically, leaving too many issues open can actually reduce flexibility. Bogging administrators down in myriad relatively minor issues prevents them from turning their full attention to the
major ones: excessive discretion overwhelms available decisional capacity and reduces executives’ ability to control agencies, particularly in a crisis. 246
Fourth, these inefficiencies likely are not distributed evenly. Information costs for influencing subtle
discretionary decisions are likely to be greater than for influencing legislation or rulemakings. Inequities
between the affluent and low-income people in access to information are probably greater than in access
to votes. As a result, if access and information are required to stimulate action, affluent people will be
able to get their needs met in a discretionary regime far better than low-income people. This, even
without malice, is likely to skew decisions profoundly by race and wealth.247
Fifth, this approach ignores the inefficiencies of leaving the public uncertain about what rules to
follow 248 and other transaction costs as policy continually changes. 249 Norms clearly defined in advance
can prove particularly vital to effective disaster responses, such as timely evacuations. 250 Where plans are
ambiguous, however, chaos is likely, and the only hedge against that chaos is likely to be the unilateral
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exercise of arbitrary power. 251 Similarly, disaster relief programs working from designs developed in
advance can be implemented much more quickly than those that must be designed on the fly.
Finally, whatever its merits as a means of achieving agreed-upon objectives, discretionary decisionmaking is an unreliable means of resolving disagreements about important matters of values. Champions
of discretionary administration assert it increases political accountability. 252

FEMA Administrator

Michael Brown may have been fired, but unless the electorate becomes convinced that his party is systematically more likely than its opponent to appoint people like him to responsible positions – a dubious
proposition given how large and diffuse each party is – it can do little about him in the coming
elections. 253 In the current, highly polarized political environment, accountability is even less likely
because partisan loyalties in Congress are likely to outweigh institutional ones and journalists have
become comfortable simply writing about cross-charges rather than sorting out facts.
B. Deferred Decision-making and Disaster Response
The urgency of responding to Hurricane Katrina brought into sharp relief other latent defects in
agencies’ deferred exercises of discretion – and demonstrated that the weaknesses of postponed decisionmaking are not confined to the executive branch. Because each policy question that must be identified,
understood, and resolved requires time, leaving more questions open increases the total amount of time
required to formulate a policy. Each open policy question that must be resolved under severe time pressure also presents another opportunity for errors, shortsightedness, and neglect. Because this is the
inevitable result of postponing too many decisions, little purpose is served by focusing on particular officials or particular defective decisions. Michael Brown has been portrayed as an especially frivolous and
callous official, but even the most attentive and compassionate policy-maker would have been inundated
by the number of decisions that needed to be made quickly and well. Some of those decisions required
knowledge of the particulars of the disaster and hence could not be made in advance. Many others,
however, were sufficiently predictable that they could have been made, or at least the options narrowed,
well in advance.
The value of narrowing discretion can be seen by comparing the responses to Hurricane Katrina of
three federal agencies, one successful and two not. The one federal agency that mounted a major Katrina
relief effort without significant public criticism was the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food and
Nutrition Service (FNS), which operates the Food Stamp Program and other nutrition assistance. FNS
succeeded because it had made most of the crucial decisions well in advance of the disaster. First, the
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Food Stamp Program has a detailed set of federal eligibility rules and procedures promulgated as rules.254
Second, FNS has taken advantage of its prior experience with disasters to develop a standard template of
deviations from those rules to apply in relief operations. Thus, when Hurricane Katrina hit, a handful of
FNS staff met for a couple of hours to choose from the short list of options within that template and to
consider a few additional departures from standard policy that might be appropriate in light of the unusual
extent of destruction and displacement.255 FNS’s disaster and evacuee food stamp policies were drafted
by two civil servants in a single afternoon and then approved and communicated to states the following
day. 256 This policy could be simple and easily implemented since it relied for the vast majority of details
on pre-existing, well-known food stamp rules. This relatively non-discretionary policy infrastructure
allowed FNS to provide emergency food assistance to over two million people within a few weeks.
FEMA’s confusion about which human and physical resources to deploy – exemplified by its
uncertainty about whether to bring in the military forces to bring order and its failure to access a hospital
ship sitting just off of the Louisiana shore through much of the critical early recovery period –
demonstrates the impact of leaving too many decisions to be made, and having too little structure
established to guide those decisions, in a time of crisis. Some, however, may insist on laying FEMA’s
failures at the door of individual officials, particularly Michael Brown and New Orleans Mayor Nagin.257
It thus may be helpful to examine a more prosaic failure of disaster relief.
The Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant is the very embodiment of governmental flexibility. The 1996 welfare law 258 created TANF to replace the already-quite-flexible Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and several child care programs. TANF eliminated
AFDC’s loose national benefit structure 259 and gave each state a fixed amount of money that it could
spend as it pleased.260 If flexibility is the key to the effective operation of governmental programs, TANF
should have offered the proudest story of success in responding to Hurricane Katrina. In fact, quite the
opposite is the case.

254

7 C.F.R. pts. 271-280 (2005).
Interview with Carolyn Foley, Assistant to the Deputy Administrator of FNS for Family Nutrition Programs, May 22, 2010.
256
Id.
257
See, e.g., Gordon Russell, Nagin Gets Mixed Reviews; Evacuation Plans, Superdome Use Criticized, NEW ORLEANS TIMESPICAYUNE, Oct. 23, 2005, at 1.
258
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 STAT. 2105 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, and 42 U.S.C.)[hereinafter PRWORA].
259
Under AFDC, states determined the income eligibility limit and the maximum grant level. 43 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1994)
(repealed 1996). They also had de facto control over the rate at which benefits were phased down for families with income:
about ten states chose to disregard a substantial amount of that income to allow it to “fill the gap” between their payment levels
and the amount they determined that families needed. HHS gave states even more flexibility to dispense with provisions of
federal law with which they disagreed through loosely-defined waivers under section 1115 of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1315.(2006).
260
Id. § 604.
255

43

It turns out that although TANF offers states considerable regulatory flexibility, they lack corresponding budgetary flexibility. Since the state financial crises that the recession of 2001 triggered, 261
virtually all TANF block grant and state maintenance of effort funds have been committed. Thus, states
had to meet any incremental relief costs occasioned by Hurricane Katrina from their general funds, the
same source that they would have depended upon in the absence of any federal program at all.
Recognizing that balanced budget requirements and the impending loss in tax revenues from the storm’s
disruption of their economies would limit what states could do, Congress enacted legislation authorizing
additional TANF funding for disaster relief. Several factors, however, blunted these funds’ impact. First,
it took Congress several weeks to authorize them. 262 Thus, states’ decisions in the first critical days
following the disaster were made with respect to what they thought they could afford within their own
budgets. Second, to avoid the even greater delays that a formula fight might trigger, Congress provided
money for evacuees as a proportional increase in every state’s block grant. Thus, New York received
enough extra money to put each of its evacuees through graduate school; Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee
did not receive enough even to house them all. 263 Third, Congress restricted a large portion of the money
to providing a particular kind of aid – one-time cash payments – that some states did not favor. States,
fearing scandals or market distortions resulting from one-time cash grants, still had to spend their own
funds to provide vouchers or on-going aid. Finally, focusing only on expanding one kind of aid rather
than expanding states’ capacity to meet the totality of survivors’ and evacuees’ needs, Congress
disallowed reimbursement of expenditures made before the effective date of the legislation. This left
Alabama, which had moved quickly to provide cash grants to survivors and evacuees with its own funds,
both embittered and with reduced capacity to meet new needs.
All of this suggests that agencies need more rigorous principles for identifying matters that ought to be
handled through rulemaking, not adjudication. In a disaster, when those resources are acutely scarce,
having as many pre-determined policies as possible can allow agencies to focus on the plethora of
unpredictable problems that arise just as stockpiling food and drinking water can free scarce transportation resources for other needs. The whimsical choices between adjudication and rulemaking that
current doctrine permits can cause obvious harm in disasters, which in turn can alert us to more subtle
inefficiencies in more normal times. By contrast, USDA’s superior disaster response owed much to clear
policies developed through prior crises, leaving only modest details to be filled in.
CONCLUSION
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In today’s contentious legal culture, universally accepted verities are in very short supply. One norm
that has approached that status has been flexibility. Regarding decision-making as an exercise of power,
and hence consumptive, makes legal actors that exercise discretion promptly seem impetuous and those
that postpone action, awaiting more information, appear judicious and prudent. In fact, decision-making
is the law’s principal productive activity. Exercises of discretion therefore should be timed in the same
manner that other productive enterprises are: by seeking the time at which the cost of required inputs is
lowest relative to the value of the output that it can produce.
Not a little ironically, another principle with broad acceptance among contemporary scholars is that
legal analysis should proceed from an ex ante perspective to the extent possible. 264 Implicit in many arguments for ex ante reasoning is the value of early decisions in guiding private parties – and the value lost
when those exercises of discretion are delayed. Unfortunately, contemporary thinking about the timing of
legal decisions tends to ignore both this diminished value of delayed decisions as well as the increased
costs of the necessary inputs. Indeed, all too often it does not conduct even the crudest cost-benefit
analysis of delay but either assumes that retaining discretion is sagacious or confounds temporal issues
with procedural and institutional ones, the latter dominating.
The calamity that Hurricane Katrina wrought provides a vivid reminder of the costs of flexibility. So,
too, does the present financial crisis, in which regulators steadfastly postponed the exercise of discretion
until the value of their potential decisions had declined by hundreds of billions of dollars. In these cases,
and countless others, the supposedly parsimonious retention of unexercised discretion has been exposed
as the wasteful procrastination that it is. The only remaining question is whether we can learn from these
mistakes or are bound to repeat them.
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